Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems by Guarro, Sergio B.
  
 
 
AR 07-01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  RISK-INFORMED SAFETY ASSURANCE  
AND PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT  
OF MISSION-CRITICAL SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE SYSTEMS   
 
 
 
 
Rev. Final - June 15, 2007 
 
 
 
 
ASCA, Inc. 
1720 South Catalina Avenue, Suite 220 
Redondo Beach, CA 90277 
Tel:  (310) 316-6249 
Fax:  (310) 316-6972 
email: info@ascainc.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final Report 
Prepared for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Johnson Space Center  
Contract No. NAS9-19180 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100006923 2019-08-30T08:53:22+00:00Z
  i
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iv 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. v 
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... vi 
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... vii 
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... xi 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2 Context-Based Software Risk Model ...................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Summary of the Context-based Software Modeling Method....................................... 6 
2.1.1 System Familiarization ........................................................................................... 6 
2.1.2 CSRM Model Development ................................................................................... 7 
2.1.3 CSRM Model Quantification.................................................................................. 9 
3 Mini AERCam System Modeling and Analysis.................................................................... 16 
3.1 Overview of the Mini AERCam System .................................................................... 16 
3.1.1 Guidance, Navigation and Control System........................................................... 18 
3.1.2 Manual Control System ........................................................................................ 19 
3.1.3 Vision System ....................................................................................................... 20 
3.1.4 Illumination System.............................................................................................. 20 
3.1.5 Battery System...................................................................................................... 20 
3.1.6 Avionics System ................................................................................................... 21 
3.1.7 Propulsion System ................................................................................................ 21 
3.1.8 Communications System ...................................................................................... 22 
3.2 Analysis of the Mini AERCam System...................................................................... 22 
3.2.1 Top-Level Event Tree Model................................................................................ 23 
3.2.2 DFM Model of the Mini AERCam System .......................................................... 23 
3.2.3 Analysis of the DFM Model ................................................................................. 26 
3.2.4 Quantification of the DFM Model ........................................................................ 27 
4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 32 
5 References ............................................................................................................................. 34 
Appendix A Software Reliability Concepts............................................................................. 35 
A.1 Definition of Software Reliability .............................................................................. 35 
A.2 Software Reliability Versus Hardware Reliability ..................................................... 35 
A.3 Software Reliability Models....................................................................................... 35 
A.A.3.1 Schneidewind Model ............................................................................................ 36 
A.4 References .................................................................................................................. 36 
Appendix B Fault Coverage .................................................................................................... 38 
B.1 Fault Coverage and Conditional Coverage................................................................. 38 
B.2 Test Coverage ............................................................................................................. 39 
Appendix C Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology ..................................................................... 40 
C.1 DFM Model Construction .......................................................................................... 40 
C.2 DFM Model Analysis ................................................................................................. 41 
C.2.1 Deductive DFM Analysis ..................................................................................... 41 
C.2.2 Inductive DFM Analysis....................................................................................... 41 
C.2.3 Applications of Deductive and Inductive Analyses.............................................. 41 
  ii
C.3 Quantification of DFM Analysis Results ................................................................... 43 
C.4 Application of DFM within the Framework of CSRM .............................................. 43 
C.5 References .................................................................................................................. 45 
 
 
  iii
ABSTRACT 
 
This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the 
framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety 
assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner.  This 
framework, called herein the “Context-based Software Risk Model” (CSRM), enables the 
assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall 
system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a 
“standard” Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for 
NASA missions and applications.  The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for 
conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-
informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission 
success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated.  The framework is based on the concept of 
context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of 
traditional PRA techniques – i.e., event trees and fault trees – in combination with more 
advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other 
dynamic logic-modeling representations.  The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a 
conditional logic and probabilistic formulation.  The application of the CSRM method 
documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the 
NASA Johnson Space Center.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This reports presents and documents a project carried out by ASCA Inc. to validate in full detail 
the application of a method for risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance of software-
intensive, mission-critical digital control systems utilized in NASA space missions.  In its 
general form, the method applied in the report was originally introduced and recommended in 
the PRA Procedure Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Ref. 1).  The application and 
validation documented herein are jointly sponsored by the NASA HQ Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance and by the NASA Johnson Space Center. 
 
Several software-related failures have occurred in space systems over the recent years, driving 
home the realization that the software used in various kinds of digital control applications 
contributes significantly to the overall risk of mission failure for such systems.  A review of the 
investigation reports for these failures (see Refs. 1 - 3) reveals that a minority of the events of 
interest can be traced back to a “software-internal” root-cause, in the form of a fault introduced 
via data entry or by a similar type of error.  However, the remaining, and larger, portion of these 
failures was due to fairly complex “balance-of-system” – software interactions, in which the fatal 
factor was the occurrence of unexpected system conditions for which the software was not 
logically designed or programmed, and to which therefore it provided an incorrect or inadequate 
response.  Recent examples of this type of software-related failure are reported in Refs. 2 and 3.   
 
A review of the principal failures of space systems that have occurred since the Ariane V maiden 
flight in 1995, produces the following observations: 
 
A. No failures were due to errors in translating the design and specifications of mission-
critical digital control and software systems into the coded part of the software, i.e. the 
part of the system constituted by programmed algorithms, logic statements and formulas. 
B. Two of the failures were due to incorrect entries in key data values utilized by the 
software.  Both of these failures occurred in project environments where the scope and 
depth of mission assurance and V&V activities had been pared down in the attempt to 
save money and accelerate schedule.  Of these two occurrences, one erroneous data entry 
was actually attributable to a software design or specification flaw concerning the system 
of measurement units used in the definition of key orbital parameter values. 
C. The remaining failures were due to incorrect or logically incomplete software design and 
specifications, i.e. the software was not correctly designed, or was not designed at all to 
deal with balance-of-system conditions that were encountered in the mission. 
 
In the above, a trend may be seen, suggesting the following conclusions: 
 
1. The traditional software test and V&V processes that have been and still are prevalent in 
the space system software development business appear to be effective in preventing 
“Type A” failures (i.e., such as in A above).  This is perhaps not surprising, since such 
processes have been routinely applied over the years to weed out Type A failures in large 
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scale commercial software applications and other types of non-safety-critical 
applications. 
2. The traditional processes are mostly successful in preventing “Type B” failures (i.e., 
such as in B above), but their effectiveness has been impaired when projects have 
attempted to save schedule and money at the expense of the integrity of such processes. 
3. The traditional processes have not been sufficiently effective in preventing “Type C” 
failures (i.e. such as in C above). 
 
The above conclusions are based on the available factual evidence.  This evidence does not 
constitute ironclad statistical proof, nor one can reasonably expect any such proof to emerge in 
the near future from more data collection, since catastrophic failures of mission-critical digital 
systems have been relatively rare and we can expect this to remain generally true in the future.  
On the other hand, software related failures have been frequent and costly enough to provide a 
clear indication that progress in methods of prevention for these failures is needed beyond the 
current state-of-the-art.  Inference on what to do with respect to this objective can be drawn from 
the factual evidence available to date, which lies in the record of the failures that have occurred 
in the past.  This evidence strongly suggests that the greatest potential for improvement in the 
reliability and safety of mission-critical, software-intensive space applications is in the 
development and implementation of assessment and assurance methods designed to identify and 
prevent situations leading to Type C failures. 
 
Consistently with the above observations and deductions, the framework discussed in this report, 
while capable of addressing Type A and B situations, is more specifically oriented towards the 
identification, assessment and prevention of Type C situations.  The method is called Context-
based Software Risk Model (CSRM) and uses a combination of traditional approaches (event 
trees and fault trees) and more advanced logic-modeling techniques, such as the Dynamic 
Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other methods in the same class, to estimate and integrate the 
contribution of digital systems and software into the overall system risk. 
 
The CSRM approach enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-
intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a fashion that is entirely compatible and 
integrated with the format of a “standard” Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently 
documented and applied for NASA missions and applications (Ref. 1).  The quantification 
aspects of CSRM are not intended, however, to simply produce a generic indication of risk level, 
but, more importantly, to provide a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting and guiding an 
organized and systematic digital system and software testing process.  The objective of this risk-
informed paradigm is to enable the formulation and demonstration of a quantitatively defined 
level of safety and mission success assurance for software-intensive digital systems.  The 
framework is based on the concept of conditional, or “context-dependent,” software risk 
scenarios, whose causality and dynamic characteristics can be modeled and identified with the 
PRA and advanced techniques mentioned above.  Following this process, the scenarios can be 
synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation.  Unlike 
traditional software V&V methods, the CSRM process lends itself well to identifying and 
assessing not only Type A and Type B, but also, more relevantly for the reasons that we have 
argued above, Type C failures.   
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In the conditional risk formulation, a mission critical scenario is synthetically described, in its 
most condensed form, by the logic expression: 
 
  CSWR SC SWR SCi i i= ∩ ( )   , 
where: 
 
CSWRi  ≡ i-th context-related SW risk-contributing scenario 
SCi   ≡ i-th context-forcing system condition 
SWR⏐ SCi   ≡ SW/digital system response given the i-th context-forcing system 
condition 
 
Accordingly, the contribution from such a scenario to the overall risk of mission failure is given, 
in conditional probability chain terms, by the formula: 
 
  )()()( iii SCSWRPSCPCSWRP ×=  
Given the above conceptual framework and formulation, the focus of the CSRM approach is then 
on the use of the logic modeling techniques that are most appropriate to identify a sufficiently 
complete set of context forcing conditions SCi so that the responses of the software intensive 
system(s) of interest, SWR⎜SCi  , can be identified and quantitatively assessed to satisfy a given 
risk goal. 
 
It is important to note that, unlike traditional software reliability assessment methods, which 
attempt to quantify software failure rates in terms of expected failures per number of hours of 
operation, the CSRM approach decouples the estimation of the rate (per unit of time) at which a 
given system may enter a context-forcing condition, from the frequency (or probability of failure 
per trial) at which the digital system may end up not responding correctly to the occurring system 
condition or “context.”  Type C failures are by definition associated with system conditions that 
have not been routinely thought of by the system and software designers, and are thus 
characterized by relatively low values of the probability term P(SCi) (order of one in a 100 or 
less in the time duration of a typical mission).  Thus, when addressing Type C failures, to 
demonstrate by testing a reasonably low risk contribution P(CSWRi) from a given scenario, the 
burden of proof associated with testing the digital, software-intensive portion of the system may 
be reduced to showing that the probability of failure of the latter, P(SWR⎜SCi) is in the order of 
one in one-hundred or one in one-thousand, with respect to system operation in logic sub-
domains randomly selected within the domain identified by each context SCi .   
 
Because it is logically driven by a systematic modeling effort, a CSRM-based testing approach 
has a sounder analytical foundation than a purely random “black box” testing approach.  Perhaps 
more importantly, its analytical foundation makes it also much more feasible in practical terms, 
since it only requires system testing time in the order of hundreds of hours, as opposed to the 
tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of hours theoretically required by the black-box 
approach to prove sufficiently low level of software-related risk. 
 
The above concepts are first illustrated in this report via simplified examples, then fully 
demonstrated via a detailed risk assessment and PRA-integration application that is the central 
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subject of the project carried out by ASCA Inc. on behalf of the NASA HQ Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance and NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).  The application of the CSRM 
method documented in this report pertains to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed 
by NASA JSC.  The MiniAERCam is an experimental mini-spacecraft that is designed to be 
deployed from an orbiting platform, such as the Space Shuttle or the International Space Station, 
to provide viewing and video recording support of robotic-arm operations.  For that purpose it 
has the capability of carrying out translational and rotational maneuvers actuated by sets of 
Xenon gas thrusters.  The maneuvers may be controlled in real-time by a human operator, or 
autonomously executed after receiving operator commands in the form of translational and 
orientation coordinates to be reached and maintained at a target position.  In either case, direct 
control of the maneuvering mini-spacecraft is entrusted to a complex digital control system.  The 
assessment carried in our project was therefore focused on developing CSRM models of the 
MiniAERCam systems, with primary focus centered on its digital and software-intensive control 
apparatus. 
 
Top-level MiniAERCam mission event trees were developed to set up a standard PRA 
framework within which the more advanced, digital-system and software focused DFM models 
were integrated to carry out the CSRM modeling steps.  The DFM analytical process was then 
applied to identify “system contexts” and digital system response modes, inclusive of possible 
faulty or inadequate responses.  Finally, a risk-informed, CSRM based testing process was 
executed with the help of a full system simulator package which had been developed by the 
Triakis Corporation, independently from this project, to support the original NASA JSC system 
design and testing activities.  The risk-informed and model-based testing showed how a risk 
level in the order of 10-5 for a specific risk scenario and context can be successfully and 
defensibly targeted for proof with a test effort in the order of a few hundred hours of computer 
and simulator time.  The meaning of the term “proof” here must be intended as being limited 
within the boundaries set by the fidelity and accuracy of the MiniAERCam system simulator 
used in the testing, as well as of the logic models used in the analytical CSRM process itself. 
 
The MiniAERCam risk-informed testing successfully completed the series of CSRM process 
steps and the associated demonstration of the CSRM end-to-end risk modeling, quantification, 
and PRA-integration capabilities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Software is a key component of modern space systems.  It is present in practically all major 
functions performed by a spacecraft or launch vehicle system, including automated hardware 
control, power management, communication flow control, telemetry, data and information 
handling.  More often than not it is entrusted with mission and safety critical aspects of such 
functions.  However, the development of generally accepted solutions to software-related safety 
and mission risk issues remains a challenge, partly due to the diversity and the complexity of the 
applications.  To estimate software risk in the context of highly complex and unique space 
systems applications, an exact and absolute estimation of SW reliability that strictly reflects its 
formal definition, as formulated for example by the IEEE, and outlined in Appendix A, is often 
not possible or even meaningful in practical terms.  This can be attributed to the considerable 
complexity of SW.  For instance, a simple program with 10 32-bit integer inputs has 2320 possible 
input states.  Hence, it is practically impossible in most cases to cover via a “brute-force” 
modeling and/or testing approach a complete SW execution domain which is defined in such 
literal terms, due to the combinatorial nature of the interactions of SW input parameter and data 
values. 
 
As a result of the difficulty in estimating and quantifying software risk, many Probability Risk 
Assessments (PRAs) and system reliability assessments do not adequately address software 
(SW) contribution to risk.  In many cases, SW risk analysis is considered too difficult and too 
resource-intensive to carry out, and the SW contribution to risk is often assumed to be negligible 
in comparison to hardware contributions. 
 
Any approach based on the assumption of generally negligible SW contribution to risk overlooks 
hard evidence provided by several major space-system failures in the last decade.  In some 
events software was the primary root-cause of a system failure, such as in the Ariane V maiden 
flight, the Centaur Upper Stage failure in the 1999 Titan IV launch of a military communication 
satellite, the NASA/JPL Mars Climate Orbiter, and, more recently, the DART mission.  In other 
events software was not the root-cause, but nevertheless represented an important contributor or 
conduit for failure, such as in the very recent Mars Global Surveyor event.  Thus, faulty SW 
design or implementation has had a central role in all these very visible and catastrophic mission 
failure events, and an analysis of these failures also shows that SW can contribute to system 
failure in ways that cannot be easily anticipated by traditional hardware failure modeling 
methods.   
 
More specifically, the mechanism of the above mentioned failure events strongly suggests that 
key assumptions underlying most hardware reliability and failure models – i.e., randomness, 
validity of constant failure rate models of failure – do not translate well into the SW realm, and 
arguably even less so in the safety-critical SW application realm.  In fact, while it may be 
perhaps argued that large size, multi layer architecture software systems, such as those found in 
distributed data management and communication networks, may “simulate” total randomness in 
behavior by the sheer volume of execution paths and type of usages, mission-critical space-
system software has its own special and different characteristics.  For example, safety-critical 
and mission-critical software is generally required by design to be kept isolated, or at least 
protected, from interference by other non-critical software.  In addition, it usually undergoes 
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formal steps of Verification & Validation (V&V) and testing processes before actual 
deployment. 
 
The nature of safety and mission critical software is such that the non-random aspects of its 
typical failure mechanisms cannot be overlooked.  In fact the same review of major SW-related 
failures that we have cited above shows that the predominant root-causes of failure for this kind 
of software were Type B or, more prevailingly, Type C situations, according to the terminology 
introduced in the Executive Summary.  For the reader’s benefit, we recall that Type B is 
characterized by a faulty user input, and Type C by an inadequacy of the software design, either 
because of a serious oversight or by having to deal with a system condition that has not been well 
understood or altogether has not been anticipated by the designer(s).  In at least two cases, e.g., 
the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Global Surveyor, both Type B and Type C errors played 
a concurrent role. 
 
In the face of this evidence, it is sensible to follow an approach to modeling software failures and 
reliability that differs from what has been attempted in the past by pure adaptation of classical 
hardware reliability modeling and quantification paradigms.  The alternative approach that is 
documented in this report is based on a system-oriented SW risk assessment perspective and uses 
an operational definition of risk as the basis for defining and obtaining SW risk metrics for 
mission-critical and safety critical software systems.  Thus, rather than focusing on the 
conventional notion and definition of “software reliability” we shall concern ourselves 
hereinafter with the following definition of “software risk”: 
 
• “Software risk is a measure of the probability and consequences of events by which, 
under the normal and abnormal conditions that must be covered by the system 
design envelope, the software used within the system may fail to successfully 
implement or support any mission-critical and safety-critical system functions.” 
 
The above definition is not in contradiction with the traditional IEEE definition of software 
reliability.  However, from an operational and practical point of view, it places the modeling and 
estimation emphasis more on the identification of the dynamic interaction and interfaces between 
system states and conditions and the desired SW functional responses to these states and 
conditions, and less on the combinatorial coverage of the SW input parameter and input data 
numerical definition spaces. 
 
The Context-based SW Risk Model (CSRM) software risk modeling and estimation approach 
discussed and demonstrated in this report is based on the above concept and definition of 
software risk.  CSRM adopts a system-oriented SW risk assessment approach and specifically 
addresses the context-dependent nature of SW failures.  In this respect, it actually enables the 
identification and quantification of failure modes that involve not just software, but the 
interaction of software with its host hardware, i.e., microprocessors and/or computers, and with 
the “balance of system” and the external environment, as applicable.  In this sense CSRM is a 
method suited for digital and software-intensive system failure modeling in general.  That is, its 
applicability is not limited to just the software portions of such systems. 
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As the reader will see in Chapter 3, the CSRM modeling and quantification steps follow the 
pattern of the steps executed within a classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) framework, 
and its models and results are designed to be readily and easily integrated with the standard 
models and results of a PRA analysis.  Within the CSRM framework, traditional PRA logic 
modeling tools, such as Event Tree (ET) and Fault Tree (FT) analysis, or more advanced ones, 
such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM), are used to decompose the system into 
scenarios representative of the contexts in which the software executes its mission critical 
functions.  The success or failure outcomes of each scenario are modeled with a conditional 
probability approach, as they depend on i) how the system enters the set of conditions that define 
the specific context of a scenario, and ii) how correctly or incorrectly the software executes its 
function(s) given that context.  The probability of success for a scenario can thus be quantified 
by estimating the probability of getting into a context and the conditional probability of correct 
software execution in that context.  The former term is generally hardware dependent and can be 
estimated with standard procedures.  The latter term is SW dependent, and can be estimated by 
testing the software within the subset bounded by the context.   
 
Chapter 3 also shows how the software risk formulation outlined above can guide the testing 
process in terms of partitioning the testing space as well as determining the success criteria.  It is 
worthwhile anticipating here one very important observation concerning the significance of the 
context base definition of software risk in terms of its implications for the conduct of software 
testing: the actual testing time required to quantify software risk in conditional terms is orders of 
magnitude less than what would be estimated on the basis of a traditional software reliability 
definition.  This is because, to achieve demonstration of reasonable levels of risk, the objective 
of the testing process is no longer to prove the software to be error free in tens or hundreds of 
thousands of hours of random operation, but to prove that it is responding correctly to randomly 
selected combinations of possible inputs within the context that defines its conditional 
probability of success or failure.  This represents a crucial difference between the two 
quantification approach concepts, and one that has a dramatic impact in terms of practical 
feasibility of demonstration of risk levels via software testing. 
 
As CSRM is similar to a traditional PRA in concept and in execution steps, the results can be 
readily integrated into a master PRA model developed with event trees and fault trees.  Hence, 
the risk contribution of software to the overall system risk can be estimated and compared with 
other contributing factors.  The key steps in the Context-based SW Risk Model have been 
successfully demonstrated via a project application to the control software of the Miniature 
Autonomous Extravehicular Robotic Camera (Mini AERCam) system.  This application and the 
results thereof are documented in detail in a dedicated chapter of this report. 
 
Following this introduction chapter, the report is organized as follows: 
 
- Chapter 2 presents the Context-based Software Risk Model and illustrates its concept 
with a relatively simple application example.  The example shows how, for such a kind of 
application, the CSRM approach can limit itself to the depth of analysis afforded with the 
use of standard, binary event-tree (and/or fault-tree) models routinely used in classical 
PRA. 
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- Chapter 3 shows how the Context-based Software Risk Model was applied with a greater 
depth of analysis to the NASA Mini AERCam system.  This application includes the use 
of the DFM technique to explicitly model and handle timing and feedback loop effects.  It 
also includes the demonstration of how the detailed digital system modeling and risk 
quantification results are readily and directly integrated into higher level standard PRA 
models and quantifications based on traditional event-tree and/or fault-tree techniques. 
 
Some key concepts relevant to the background or to the application of CSRM are provided in the 
Appendices: 
- Appendix A presents a brief discussion of software reliability methods. 
- Appendix B provides some key definitions of fault coverage. 
- Appendix C gives an overview of the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM), a 
technique specifically developed for dynamic system and software logic modeling, and 
provides some related key definitions. 
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2 CONTEXT-BASED SOFTWARE RISK MODEL 
 
The basic concept of the Context-based SW Risk Modeling (CSRM) method is that software 
failures are highly context dependent, therefore, the probability of success or failure of software-
driven and software-controlled operations can change drastically when the system of which the 
software is a part enters a different “context.”  The boundary conditions and inputs to the 
software produced by the “balance-of-system” are ultimately what determines a proper or faulty 
response by the software itself.  Unlike the majority of hardware failures that are characterized as 
being random in time with a certain type of failure rate (typically assumed to actually be constant 
in time), software failures are driven by a conditional cause-effect mechanism, by which faults in 
software logic design, or faults introduced accidentally at the time of coding or compilation, 
become actual failures when a specific logic path of instruction execution is traversed and 
activated because of a certain input condition – i.e., by a certain specific combination of inputs 
received from the balance-of-system and / or external environment. 
 
The above premise is the key to understanding that the CSRM method follows an approach to 
modeling and quantifying risk scenarios significantly affected by software operational behavior 
that is quite different in its rationale, but also in its practical application aspects, from the 
traditional software reliability estimation methods.  The CSRM approach directly reflects the 
concept introduced above and in Chapter 1, i.e., that software failures do not occur 
unconditionally in a random-in-time fashion, but conditionally, in response to the occurrence of 
balance-of-system events, which may themselves be random or the result of specific system 
mission profiles and/or history.  The assumption of software failure randomness, which is 
implicit in practically all “black box” software reliability estimation models, is never truly valid, 
but may be practically tolerable in “bulk” software applications, such as in telephone network 
switching, or distributed large-database control software, where the extremely large number and 
variety of conditions results in an appearance of randomness in software behavior.  However, 
such assumption is definitely invalid and misleading in more self-contained and restricted 
software applications, such as mission-critical and safety-critical space system applications.  It is 
in the latter category of applications that the conditional risk perspective of CSRM is not only 
more valid in its concept and rationale, but also much more practically useful, as it brings with it 
the capability of demonstrating compliance with bounding levels of risk with a practically 
implementable software test process.  
 
Although this report provides the most complete documentation to date of the CSRM method in 
its integrated form, along with its modes of application, and although the CSRM appellation has 
been formulated for the first time in the preparation of the report itself, all the key constitutive 
elements of the CSRM have been individually or jointly demonstrated and used in several project 
applications in both the nuclear power plant and space system industries.  Both the underlying 
concepts and the past practical applications are documented in the open technical literature [4 – 
8].  The method is also documented and illustrated, minus its present denomination and acronym, 
in the NASA HQ OSMA PRA Procedures Guide [1]. 
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2.1 Summary of the Context-based Software Modeling Method 
 
The CSRM method is executed by carrying out the following steps.  These steps correspond to 
the standard execution steps of a typical PRA, as referred to in parentheses. 
 
1. Identify all mission-critical and safety-critical system functions supported by software 
(System Familiarization Step of PRA). 
2. Identify all major logic conditions of mission-critical system function execution that may 
induce or trigger software errors (Model Development Step of PRA). 
3. Quantify or bound the probability of erroneous software behavior in response to system 
conditions identified per Step 2 (Risk Quantification Step of PRA). 
 
These steps are discussed in detail in Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3.  Throughout the discussion in these 
sections, an application to a simple control system will be used to illustrate the key concepts.  
This simple control system includes the Sensing and Command (S&C) portion of a spacecraft 
Attitude Control System (ACS). This system provides the attitude determination and control 
function of a three-axis-stabilized satellite bus.  The schematic in Figure 2-1 provides an overall 
pictorial representation of the ACS function and its primary associated hardware and software 
components.  The detailed function of this system will be introduced in Section 2.1.1. 
 
Attitude Control System
ACS
Computer
Satellite Bus
Attitude
Thruster
Actuators
Star-Tracker
Sensors
Gyro
Sensors
Sensing & Command 
Function
Actuation
Function
 
Figure 2-1: Schematic Definition of Spacecraft Attitude Control System 
 
2.1.1 System Familiarization 
 
The objective of this step is to identify all the critical system functions executed directly or 
supported indirectly by the software.  This ensures that the analytical steps implemented later 
will cover all potential risk contribution from the software, either by inclusion in the model or 
exclusion from the model with appropriate justification. 
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For the example system shown in Figure 2-1, it is composed of a set of three Gyro Sensors, a set 
of two Star-Tracker Sensors, and the ACS Computer, where the ACS software resides.  In 
“normal mode,” the ACS software uses the attitude measurements from the gyros.  More 
specifically, at least two of the three gyros onboard are needed for the successful execution of the 
function in this mode. 
 
If two of the three existing gyros fail, the ACS can switch to a “contingency mode” of operation, 
whereby attitude information from the surviving gyro is used in combination with less precise 
measurements from either one of two star-tracker sensors that are also onboard the spacecraft. 
 
The ACS software is designed to sense gyro failures and switch the ACS control function to 
contingency mode when two such failures are detected.  In contingency mode, the software not 
only employs a different combination of sensors, as defined above, but also a different set of 
control algorithms to elaborate the appropriate commands to the attitude stabilization thrusters.  
Figure 2-2 illustrates the logic and functional arrangement “normal mode” and “contingency 
mode” of ACS and S&C operation. 
 
Gyro 1
Gyro 2
Gyro 3
2 of 3
S-Tracker 1
S-Tracker 2
1 of 3
1 of 2
2 of 2
Normal
Function
Contingency
Function
To Actuators
ACS Software
 
Figure 2-2: Schematic Definition of ACS Software Sensor Inputs and Functions 
 
2.1.2 CSRM Model Development 
 
Once the software-related critical system functions are identified, the next step is to identify all 
major logic conditions of mission-critical system function execution that may induce or trigger 
software errors.  The objective is to decompose the software-related system risk into a 
disjunction of N context-dependent terms, as expressed by Equations [2.1] and [2.2] below: 
 
SSWR CSWRi
i
N
≡
=1
U  
[2.1] 
 
CSWR SC SWR SCi i i= ∩ ( )  
[2.2] 
 
where: 
SSWR  ≡ overall system-level SW-related risk 
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CSWRi  ≡ i-th context-related SW risk-contributing item 
SCi   ≡ i-th context-forcing system condition 
SWR⏐ SCi ≡ SW response given the i-th context-forcing system condition 
 
For the simple ACS example, the decomposition of the system-level risk is shown in Equation 
[2.3]: 
 
SeCSWCNSWNSSWR ∪∩∪∩= ])([])([  
[2.3] 
 
where, 
N   ≡ Normal mode of operation 
SW⏐ N ≡ SW response given the normal mode of operation 
C   ≡ Contingency mode of operation 
SW⏐ C ≡ SW response given the contingency mode of operation 
Se   ≡ Failed mode 
 
After the context decomposition step, logic PRA models will be used to analyze the context-
dependent terms in Equations [2.1] and [2.2].  The type of PRA models used will be determined 
by the nature and complexity of the system(s) of interest.  For simpler types of system 
conditions, standard binary-logic PRA models such as event-trees, Event Sequence Diagrams 
(ESDs), and/or fault-trees can be used.  To address more complex scenarios involving time-
dependent and dynamic system / SW interactions, more advanced methods, such as the Dynamic 
Flowgraph Methodology (DFM), may be necessary. 
 
2.1.2.1 CSRM Modeling for Complex System and Software Functions 
 
When System / Software function interfaces are complex and affected by other than simple logic, 
the use of more sophisticated modeling tools may become necessary. Factors of complexity that 
are often relevant in the modeling of more complex systems include relative timing and 
synchronization of tasks and events, and/or multiple levels of system or function degradation 
before an outright complete failure occurs. 
 
Among the modeling tools available to address these more complex issues are Dynamic Fault 
Tree models and DFM models. 
 
Dynamic FT modeling combines the use of traditional FTs with Markov/semi-Markov state 
transition models. This permits modeling certain types of dynamic transition effects of interest in 
software failure representation, such as the effect of software fault-recovery features, when these 
are part of the design of the more complex types of software-controlled systems, e.g., large 
aircraft avionic and navigation systems. 
  
DFM is a general-purpose dynamic Multi-Valued Logic (MVL) modeling and analytical tool and 
is described in detail in Appendix C.  DFM models permit the representation of relative function 
and parameter timing and use multi-valued discrete logic definitions and algorithms. DFM 
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models provide a relatively complete representation of system functions, not just the 
representation of its failure modes, and can be utilized and analyzed in different fashions. When 
traversed inductively, they generate scenario representations conceptually similar to ET or ESD 
model representations, although of course not limited to binary variable and state representations 
like the latter. When traversed deductively, they produce the multi-state variable equivalent of 
binary FT models and generate failure “prime implicants,” which are the multi-valued logic 
equivalent of binary logic “cut-sets” (e.g., FT cut-sets).  DFM models also include Automated 
Test Vector Generation (ATVG) capability that can be employed to assist software functional 
test processes. 
 
DFM can be used within the CSRM framework to support qualitative and quantitative software 
risk assessments.  The qualitative results identified the combinations of hardware and/or software 
conditions that could threaten the system, and the quantitative results estimate the risk 
contribution from these hardware and/or software conditions.   
 
DFM has been applied and demonstrated in several aerospace and nuclear power plant 
applications.  Both the theoretical aspects of the methodology and its applications are 
documented in the open and refereed technical literature, as well as in detailed technical reports 
[5 – 8].  As mentioned earlier, a more detailed discussion of DFM is provided in Appendix C. 
 
For the simple ACS example, an event tree model can be constructed to show the different 
success and failure paths for both the “normal” and “contingency” ACS software and system 
functions.  This event tree model is shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
Sensor-set
Available
for Normal
S&C
Normal
S&C SW
Function
Error-free
Sensor-set
Available
for Cntgcy
S&C
Cntgcy
S&C SW
Function
Error-free
S&C Success P1 P2
S&C Failure P1 (1-P2)
S&C Failure (1-P1) (1-P3)
S&C Failure (1-P1) P3 (1-P4)
P1 P2
P3 P41-P1
1-P2
1-P3
1-P4
S&C Success (1-P1) P3 P4
P(N) = P1 PSW/N = 1 - P2
P(C) = (1 - P1) P3 PSW/C = 1 - P4
P(Se) = (1 - P1) (1 – P3) 
S&C
Mission
Starts
 
Figure 2-3: Event-Tree Model for the Example ACS 
 
2.1.3 CSRM Model Quantification 
 
After the development and analysis of the logic PRA models, the final step is to quantify or 
“bound” the probability of erroneous software behavior in response to system conditions 
previously identified. 
 
The CSWRi context-related SW risk-contributing items that appear in Equations [2.1] and [2.2] 
can usually be considered as being independent and mutually exclusive, so that in terms of 
associated probabilities, the quantitative risk formulation below can be applied: 
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SSWR P SC P SWR SCi i
i
N
≡ ×
=
∑[ ( ) ( )]
1
 
[2.4] 
 
It is important to note that the risk scenario formulation expressed by Equations [2.1], [2.2] and 
[2.4] can be partitioned by subsystem and/or function of the entire space system and mission of 
interest, so that one can obtain either: 
 
• The overall contribution of SW to overall system risk, or 
• The contribution of SW to the probability of failure of a particular subsystem, or mission 
function and phase. 
 
2.1.3.1 Quantification of Normal Conditions and Abnormal Conditions 
 
Using the context decomposition (Equation [2.4]) as a road map, SW functional analysis can be 
carried out and the risk scenario modeling results can be used to guide the SW test process, 
which in turn drives risk scenario quantification.  In essence the analysis permits the partitioning 
of quantification and associated testing between: 
 
A. A subset of “normal conditions” that have high values for the P(SCi) terms (order of 
magnitude 10-1 to 1) and thus need to be shown to have low values (typically order of 
magnitude < 10-3) for the conditional probabilities of erroneous SW response, 
P(SWR⏐SCi). 
B. Subsets of “off-normal” conditions, triggered by balance-of-system failure or anomaly 
events with relatively low value probabilities P(SCi) (order of magnitude < 10-2), and thus 
only need to be shown to have “low-enough” values for the conditional probabilities of 
erroneous SW response, P(SWR⏐SCi) (typically order of magnitude 10-2 or lower). 
 
It is also very important to note that the conditional risk formulation in Equation [2.4] permits 
quantification by testing ‘logic partitions” in the input space of the software identified by the 
functional PRA-style modeling in Step 2.  Software reliability is determined by the number of 
separate input parameter logic-partition regions that can be tested with a randomized test scheme.  
This has nothing to do with the number of hours of software testing that is routinely cited as an 
impediment to quantification of software reliability, since by a computerized test scheme one can 
relatively traverse thousands or hundreds of thousand input condition partitions and thus 
establish high confidence, low probability bounds for the P(SWR⏐ SCi), and consequently 
overall SSWR, terms in Equation [2.4].  Furthermore, the burden of testing for the more 
troublesome risk contributions in Equation [2.4] – the ones that correspond to anomalous system 
conditions – can be usually low in terms of SW testing, since for these the situation B in the 
above “bullet” applies, and the demonstration by testing that P(SWR⏐ SCi) terms are in the 10-2 
order of magnitude is typically sufficient to demonstrate a low risk contribution by the 
corresponding scenarios. 
 
In general, the recommended quantification of Equation [2.4] terms can proceed by choosing for 
each CSWRi scenario the best applicable SW reliability estimation model.  For example, 
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quantification of “type A” normal condition CSWRi  scenarios, where P(SCi) values are by 
definition high and thus P(SWR⏐ SCi) values should be demonstrated to be very low, one could 
use a Bayesian belief network approach that accounts for generic and process-related 
information, as proposed in Ref. 9, to generate a prior for the P(SWR⏐ SCi) values.  Each such 
prior could then be “updated” (in the Bayesian statistical estimation sense) via the appropriate 
type of testing process that would be feasible in terms of time and resources. 
 
The “type B” anomaly or exception driven CSWRi  scenarios, on the other hand, can be 
successfully quantified, regardless of whether the statistical method preferred is classical or non-
informative-prior-Bayesian, with a low number of  tests, logically partitioned as discussed earlier 
to prove P(SWR⏐ SCi) values to be below an upper bound that doesn’t need to be any lower than 
order-of-10-2. 
 
The above needs to be fully appreciated and understood, since it is a fundamental strength and 
practical advantage of the context-based, conditional-risk approach to SW reliability and risk 
assessment.  As an additional key point also strongly supporting the practical feasibility of the 
approach, it must be noted that what determines the amount of time and resources required to 
execute context-based testing for either “type A” or “type B” conditions is the time necessary to 
traverse a sufficient number of logic test partitions, i.e. logic sub-domains, within a given system 
context.  This is quite different, and orders of magnitude shorter, than the system test time 
associated with having to prove a very low “number of failures per hours of testing.”  That is, the 
number of logically independent test cases identified via the scenario and context driven SW risk 
modeling process (Step 2 summarily described above) needs to be large enough to demonstrate a 
sufficiently small rate of “failures per number of independent test trials.”  Because a 
computerized test-bed can execute hundreds, if not thousands, of test trials per hour of actual test 
operation, the demonstration of high SW response reliability is possible within the practical 
resource limitations of a test based approach.   
 
In closing this section, we also note that, if the SW risk assessor has other means than testing for 
demonstrating reliability and risk levels of certain SW responses and executions, e.g., via 
“formal-methods” and/or “theorem-proofs,” such estimates can equally well be used in the risk- 
quantification formula (Equation [2.4]), at least in the sense of providing a Bayesian prior 
estimate to be updated with actual SW test or operational data as the latter becomes available. 
 
2.1.3.2 Adjustment to Account for Software Testing Conditions 
 
Since in testing, the SW may not be subjected to the same environment as in the actual system 
application.  If a specific function cannot be tested in its true “mission-configuration,” either 
because it is not well defined, or because it is complex, or because of any other reasons, then 
the conditional SW reliability estimation may have to be modified with an appropriate 
adjustment factor, which will usually act in the conservative direction, i.e., pushing towards a 
lower reliability estimate than what is produced by the form of testing that is possible.   
 
Table 2-1 provides an example of how the definition and selection of such adjustment factors 
or alternative conditional probability estimations may be organized and executed. The 
selection of factors or altogether alternative probability estimations for individual functions 
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may ultimately depend on the type of software-function triggering condition, its testability, and 
the type of testing that was applied as the basis for the software reliability model, regardless of 
whether the latter was in the form of a straight statistical estimation, or in the form of a more 
complex SW reliability-growth formulation. The compilation of a table like Table 2-1 permits 
an expert judgment of to what degree a software reliability estimation obtained for a particular 
software module can be applied to specific functions that are relevant in a conditional 
probability formulation like Equation [2.4].  The objective is to judge whether the software 
reliability model may have been applied to a software module containing the function but 
exerting it under conditions substantially different from those that may be encountered in the 
actual mission, or, in cases of more extreme divergence between test and mission conditions, 
whether the actual function may have not been exerted at all in testing.   
 
The different values of the factor that can be used in such a tabulation should be arrived at via a 
process of expert elicitation, which should include software design engineers and software test 
experts as well as PRA experts.  This process may be carried out in three steps: 
 
1. Define the table structure, i.e., identify, structure and characterize, in qualitative 
and/or discrete terms, all the factors that are believed to have determinant 
influence on the value of the adjustment for the originally obtained direct 
estimation of the conditional software POF; 
 
2. Define the ranges of magnitude of adjustment of the direct estimation believed 
appropriate for each combination of qualitative or discrete characterizations of the 
determining influence factors; 
 
3. Select a specific value, or distribution within the defined range, for the adjustment 
factor to be applied to the originally estimated conditional probability. 
 
Continuing with the illustration using the ACS example, the quantitative formulation in Equation 
[2.4] can be applied to yield: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )SePPCPPNPP C/SWN/SWCF&S ++=  
[2.5] 
 
the first two summation terms on the right correspond to the probability of software failure, 
expressed in the same form as in Equation [2.4].  The term P(N) denotes the probability of 
occurrence of the “normal mode” of ACS software execution, PSW/N being the conditional POF 
of the software given the normal mode of execution.  Similarly, the term P(C) denotes the 
probability of occurrence of the “contingency mode” of ACS software execution, and PSW/C is 
the conditional POF of the software, given the latter.  The last term on the right in Equation [2.5], 
P(Se), corresponds on the other hand to a system failure scenario completely determined by 
hardware failures, i.e., the unavailability of any minimum set of sensors needed to execute the 
function. 
 
For the quantification of the conditional model summarized by Equation [2.5], one can refer to 
the more detailed breakdown of probability terms provided in Figure 2-3. 
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Table 2-1: Selection of Software Conditional Failure Probability Adjustment Factor 
 
Case 
Identifie
d 
Type of 
Input 
Condtn. Ck 
Type of 
SW 
Function 
Type of Testing Conditional Prob. Adjustment 
Factor, Ak 
1 Normal Routine Formal in Actual 
HW/SW System 
Configuration 
Use SW Rel. Growth Model w/ No 
Adjustment (Ak = 1) 
2   Formal in Simulated 
System 
Configuration 
Adjust SW Rel. Growth Model w/ 
Low-to-Moderate Factor 
3 Exception Defined / 
Simple 
Formal in Actual 
HW/SW System 
Configuration 
Use SW Rel. Growth Model w/ No 
Adjustment (Ak = 1) 
4   Formal in Simulated 
System 
Configuration 
Adjust SW Rel. Growth Model w/ 
Moderate Factor 
5   Not Formally Tested Assume Moderate Conditional 
Probability of Failure 
6  Defined / 
Complex 
Formal in Actual 
HW/SW System 
Configuration 
Use SW Rel. Growth Model w/ No 
Adjustment (Ak = 1) 
7   Formal in Simulated 
System 
Configuration 
Adjust SW Rel. Growth Model w/ 
Moderate-to-High Factor 
8   Not Formally Tested Assume Moderate-to-High 
Conditional Probability of Failure 
9  Undefined N/A Assume High-to-Very High 
Conditional Probability of Failure 
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The S&C hardware-related failure probabilities that provide quantification of the term P(Se) are 
identified as (1−P1) and (1−P3) in the ET representation and are both derived by standard means. 
Thus, P1 corresponds to the reliability of the normal set of ACS sensors, i.e., to the probability 
that at least two-out-of-three gyros are functioning, while P3 is the reliability of the 
“contingency” set of sensors, i.e., the probability that the one surviving gyro and one-of-two star-
tracker sensors are functioning, after two gyros have failed. 
 
Calculation of the probabilities P1 and P3 also permit quantification of the terms P(N) and P(C) in 
the software conditional failure formulation, as indicated by the formulas shown in Figure 2-3. 
To complete the quantification of Equation [2.5], one needs to estimate the conditional failure 
probability terms PSW/N and PSW/C, or their complements P2 and P4, which appear in the ET 
formulation of Figure 2-3. 
 
The probabilities PSW/N and PSW/C can be obtained from black-box reliability-growth 
estimations (see for example Ref. 10) applied specifically to each of the software modules or 
functional blocks that implement the function of interest, with adjustments to account for 
differences between the testing environment and the actual operation environment.   
 
To illustrate the above suggested process, we refer again to Table 2-1, assuming that Step 1 has 
resulted in the definition of the table as shown. Then Step 2 may result in a definition of Ak 
factor or conditional failure probability PF/Ck ranges as follows: 
 
 Case #1: Ak = 1 
 Case #2: Ak range: 2 to 5 
 Case #3: Ak = 1 
 Case #4: Ak range: 5 to 10 
 Case #5: PF/Ck range:  0.01 to 0.1 
 Case #6: Ak = 1 
 Case #7: Ak range: 10 to 50 
 Case #8:  PF/Ck range:  0.1 to 0.5 
 Case #9:  PF/Ck range:  0.5 to 1.0 
 
To complete the illustration of the process, let us assume that the ACS software testing was 
carried for the “normal mode” function under conditions corresponding to Table 2-1 Case 1, i.e., 
 
Type of Input Condition Ck: Normal 
Type of Software Function: Routine 
Type of Testing Executed: Formal in Actual Hardware/Software System Configuration, 
 
and let us also assume that use of the test data relative to this function in a reliability growth 
model like the one discussed in 2.1.3 had resulted in the assessment of a probability of software 
failure value N/SWP′ . The application of the adjustment “rules” formulated in Step 2 of the 
elicitation process would then yield a final value for the normal function: 
 
kN/SWN/SW A'PP =  
[2.6] 
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which in this case yields simply: 
 
N/SWN/SW 'PP =  
[2.7] 
 
as: 
 
1A k =  
[2.8] 
 
For the ACS software “contingency” function, however, let us hypothesize that the assessment 
conditions are judged to correspond to Case 7 of Table 2-1, i.e., 
 
Type of Input Condition Ck: Exception 
 
Type of Software Function: Defined-Complex 
 
Type of Testing Executed: Formal in Simulated System Configuration 
 
We can further assume that the use of the test data relative to this function in the reliability 
growth model resulted in the derivation of a probability of software failure value C/SWP′ . The 
application of the adjustment “rules” formulated in Step 2 would now require the selection of an 
Ak value between 10 and 50. Thus, assuming for example that the expert elicitation process led 
to the selection of an Ak value of 15, the final conditional failure probability value for the 
contingency function would be: 
 
C/SWkC/SWC/SW 'P15A'PP ==  
[2.9] 
 
The values thus estimated for PSW/N and PSW/C would finally be combined in Equation [2.4] with 
the values calculated for the probabilities of the respective “conditions,” P(N) and P(C) and with 
the purely hardware-driven probability P(Se), to yield an estimate of the ACS S&C function 
failure probability. 
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3 MINI AERCAM SYSTEM MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Mini AERCam System (Section 3.1) and discusses the 
analyses performed (Section 3.2) on the prototype system that was made available to ASCA. 
 
3.1 Overview of the Mini AERCam System 
 
The Miniature Autonomous Extravehicular Robotic Camera (Mini AERCam) is a free flying 
satellite developed to provide flexible remote viewing capabilities in support of manned-space 
missions.  In a nominal mission, it is released from the cargo bay of the Space Transportation 
System (STS).  Its main function is to provide a color video orthogonal view to support the use 
of the International Space Station (ISS) robotic arm.  Some features of the Mini AERCam nano-
satellite include: 
 
• Capability to transmit color NTSC video and high resolution still images,  
• Six degrees of freedom motion, 
• Can be manually controlled via joysticks. 
• Can autonomously perform point-to-point movement, absolute position hold, and relative 
station keeping. 
 
Its predecessor, the AERCam Sprint, was successfully tested on a shuttle mission.  The Mini 
AERCam provides a superset of the Sprint capabilities while using Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) technology within a smaller, less expensive and more robust package. 
 
A picture of the Mini AERCam nano-satellite is shown in Figure 3-1.  Figure 3-2 shows a layout 
of the Mini AERCam nano-satellite.  It consists of the following major sub-systems: 
 
• Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) 
• Control Station 
• Vision 
• Illumination 
• Battery 
• Avionics 
• Propulsion  
• Communication 
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Figure 3-1: The Mini AERCam Nano-satellite [Ref. 11] 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Layout of the Mini AERCam Nano-satellite [Ref. 11] 
  18
 
The interactions between these major sub-systems are shown in Figure 3-3.  The following sub-
sections describe these sub-systems in greater detail. 
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Figure 3-3: Interactions between the Mini AERCam Major Sub-systems 
3.1.1 Guidance, Navigation and Control System 
 
The function of the GN&C system is to estimate the current position, velocity, attitude and 
attitude rate of the nano-satellite.  It then processes the autonomous and manual commands, and 
determines the appropriate thruster actions in order to implement these commands. 
 
The position is measured by the Global Positioning System (GPS).  The nano-satellite has 2 
custom GPS antennae, one on top and one at the bottom, and a COTS GPS receiver.  The raw 
GPS measurements are then processed internally in the control software through a Kalman filter.  
The GN&C uses this position and the previous position measurement to determine the nano-
satellite’s velocity. 
 
The 3 Draper Micro-electromechanical System (MEMS) gyroscopes are used to measure the 
attitude rates.  These attitude rates are then processed in the control software to provide estimates 
for the attitude. 
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In addition to processing the GPS and gyroscope data, the control software processes the 
autonomous and manual commands to determine the appropriate commands for the thrusters. 
 
3.1.2 Manual Control System 
 
The Manual Control System provides the manual interface for the pilot to control of the nano-
satellite.  This system consists of the Situational Awareness Displays (SADs), the control station, 
the translational hand controller, and the rotational hand controller (Figure 3-4) In the 
autonomous mode, the pilot enters commands via the control station.  On the other hand, in the 
manual mode, the pilot uses the hand controllers to steer the nano-satellite.  The situational 
awareness displays are capable of providing a “God’s Eye view” (Figure 3-5) to assist the pilot 
in precise steering of the nano-satellite. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: The Manual Control System [Ref. 11] 
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Figure 3-5: God’s Eye View for Precise Manual Steering [Ref. 11] 
 
3.1.3 Vision System 
 
The Vision System consists of 3 Onboard Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) 
cameras arranged in 2 arrays, the main camera array and the orthogonal camera array.  The main 
camera array is composed of a color video camera and a high-resolution (1 mega pixel) still 
camera.  The orthogonal camera array, located 90° from the main camera array along the equator 
of the nano-satellite, is composed of a color video camera.  The images captured by these camera 
arrays are compressed onboard using COTS hardware and custom software. 
 
3.1.4 Illumination System 
 
The Illumination System is used to illuminate the target while the Vision System is capturing the 
images.  It is provided by a single array of Light emitting diodes (LED) oriented in line with the 
main camera array.  LEDs are used for long life and low power consumption. 
 
3.1.5 Battery System 
 
The Battery System supplies power to all the electrical components of the nano-satellite.  It 
consists of rechargeable lithium-ion batteries that can provide power for an average of six hours.  
Power is turned on and off manually by pressing buttons on the surface of the Mini AERCam. 
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3.1.6 Avionics System 
 
The Avionics System interfaces between the hardware and the rest of the nano-satellite systems.  
Most hardware system interface functions are stored in a Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA).  It resides in the avionics board housed in the central ring.  The processing unit of the 
avionics board is a PowerPC 740 processor operating at 266MHz, and the board is equipped with 
64 MB of Random Access Memory (RAM). 
 
3.1.7 Propulsion System 
 
The Propulsion System consists of 12 thrusters arranged in 4 arrays around the central ring.  Two 
of the four arrays consist of 2 thrusters per array, and the other two arrays consist of 4 thrusters 
each.  Each thruster provides about 0.025 lb of thrust.  Figure 3-6 shows the cross-section of an 
array with 2 thrusters.  Figure 3-7 shows the position and orientation of the 12 thrusters.  These 
arrays of thrusters provide six degrees-of-freedom maneuvering capability.  The propellant used 
is pressurized cold-gas Xenon.  A depleted propellant tank can be recharged manually. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Cross Section of 2 Thrusters in the Propulsion System [Ref. 11] 
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Figure 3-7: Position of the 12 Thrusters [Ref. 12] 
3.1.8 Communications System 
 
The Communications System provides contact between the nano-satellite and the Control 
Station.  It consists of one micropatch antenna and an onboard hardware wireless-Ethernet 
controller.  Video and telemetry data are both transmitted in a single multiplexed stream 
 
3.2 Analysis of the Mini AERCam System 
 
A limited scope Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was executed to demonstrate the 
integration of hardware and conditional (white box) software reliability models using traditional 
(Event Tree, Fault Tree) and modern (DFM) PRA techniques.  In this limited scope analysis, the 
PRA was focused on the performance of the nano-satellite itself.  The following assumptions 
were made: 
 
• The ISS and docking bay were assumed to work correctly,  
• The AERCam command station was assumed to work correctly, and 
• The operator did not send incorrect commands to the AERCam. 
 
As a result of the 3rd assumption, destructive collisions are the direct result of erroneous 
movement made solely by the AERCam.  It is not the result of inadvertent operator commands. 
 
A typical mission consists of the following phases: 
1. Release from the docking bay, 
2. Autonomous control of the Mini AERCam to reach the vicinity of the target position, 
3. Autonomous station keeping to maintain relative position with the target, so as to carry 
out the video capture and transmission functions, 
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4. Autonomous control of the Mini AERCam to return to the docking bay, and 
5. Retrieval of the Mini AERCam into the docking bay. 
 
These mission phases can be summarized in the mission tree in Figure 3-8. 
 
(0)
SamCam is 
Released 
from 
Docking Bay
(2)
Autonomous 
Relative 
Station
Keeping
(1)
Manual 
Approach to
Arm-Support
Position
(3)
Send Video (4)Maneuver 
Back to 
Dock
(5)
Docking Bay 
Harddocks
with 
SamCam
FailFail Fail
Success
FailFail Fail
Begin 
Mission
Success
 
Figure 3-8: Mini AERCam Mission Tree 
The PRA was performed for the phases corresponding to the autonomous approach to the target 
and the autonomous station keeping with the target. 
 
3.2.1 Top-Level Event Tree Model 
 
The logic structure of the PRA was organized in a top down manner.  A top-level event tree was 
first developed to show the path for mission success and failure.  This top-level event tree is 
shown in Figure 3-9. 
 
Manual
Approach
To Arm
GN&C Success P1 P2
GN&C Failure P1 (1-P2)
P1 P2
1-P1
1-P2
GN&C Failure (1-P1)
Autonomous
Relative
Station 
Keeping
Release From
Docking Bay
 
Figure 3-9: Top-Level Event Tree Model 
The event tree in Figure 3-9 identifies the key events and probabilities of interest with respect to 
Steps 1 and 2 of the mission tree shown in Figure 3-8.  The pivotal events in Figure 3-9 were 
expanded with DFM to analyze the complex interaction of hardware and software systems in the 
GN&C functions that are of interest for evaluating these events and probabilities.  DFM was 
used instead of fault trees because the GN&C functions consist of combinations of continuous 
and discrete behaviors that are easily handled by the multi-valued logic modeling capability of 
DFM.  The DFM model constructed was analyzed and quantified to estimate the branch point 
probabilities in the event tree model.  Thus, a DFM analysis is equivalent in concept and results 
provided to the fault-tree analyses carried out in a traditional PRA to provide further definition 
and quantification to system sequences initially defined via event-tree models 
 
3.2.2 DFM Model of the Mini AERCam System 
 
To analyze the pivotal events in the event tree shown in Figure 3-9, a DFM model of the Mini 
AERCam System was developed to capture the behavior of the key hardware components, the 
Autonomous 
Approach to 
Arm 
Autonomous 
Relative Station 
eeping 
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functions of the software modules, as well as the interactions between the hardware and the 
software.  The DFM model was developed as a hierarchy in a modular manner.  A top-level 
model (Figure 3-10) was first developed to show the relationship between key sub-systems.  In a 
DFM model, nodes (shown in circles) are used to represent key parameters.  These nodes are 
discretized into a finite number of states.  For example, the node “Attitude” is discretized into 3 
states to model the accuracy of the Mini AERCam attitude control function.  The black boxes, 
such as the ones shown for GN&C and Propulsion, were expanded in intermediate-level DFM 
models to represent the full details of these sub-systems.  Figure 3-11 shows the intermediate-
level DFM model for the GN&C sub-system and Figure 3-12 shows the intermediate level DFM 
model for the propulsion sub-system.  The model expansion process was repeated as needed. 
 
This node represents the actual 
attitude of the Mini-AERCam.
It is discretized into 3 states:
1.  Correct
(Error < 4˚)
2.  Slightly Inaccurate
(Error of 4˚ to 8˚)
3.  Inaccurate
(Error > 8˚)
1 clk = 1 sec.
 
 
Figure 3-10: Top-Level DFM Model of the Mini AERCam System 
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This sub-model 
includes the GPS 
hardware and the 
translational 
navigation 
software.
This sub-model 
includes the 
angular rate gyro 
hardware and the 
rotational 
navigation 
software.
 
Figure 3-11: Intermediate-Level DFM Model of the GN&C Sub-system 
 
 
This node represents a leak in the propulsion
system fuel lines after the isovalve but before the
thruster solenoids.
It is discretized into 4 states:
1.  None
2.  Small (1 – 40%)
A small leak produces thrust and torque of 
less than 40% of the total thrust and torque 
the Mini-AERCam can produce to 
counteract it.  A leak of this magnitude 
should not significantly affect the 
performance of the Mini-AERCam.
3.  Large (41-80%)
Produces thrust or torque within 80% of the 
Mini-AERCam’s.  The Mini-AERCam can 
compensate and should be recoverable, but 
its performance is inadequate to perform its 
mission safely.
4.  Critical (> 81%)
The Mini-AERCam is expected to be
uncontrollable.
 
Figure 3-12: Intermediate-Level DFM Model of the Propulsion Sub-system 
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3.2.3 Analysis of the DFM Model 
 
The hierarchy of DFM models developed is analyzed for the pivotal events of interest in the 
event tree shown in Figure 3-9.  For example, to analyze the root cause of the Autonomous 
Point-to-Point Maneuvering Failure, this failure condition was defined as the Top Event and the 
hierarchy of the DFM models was analyzed deductively.  This deductive DFM analysis yields n 
prime implicants (PIs).  A prime implicant is a minimum combination of basic events that could 
cause the top event.  It is the multi-valued logic equivalent of a minimal cut set.  Hence, the top 
event can be expressed in terms of the n prime implicants as shown in Equation [3.1]. 
 
Top Event = PI1 ∨ … ∨ PIn 
[3.1] 
 
These prime implicants contain hardware conditions, software conditions, or combinations of 
both hardware and software conditions.  In the following discussions, the first three prime 
implicants obtained for the analysis show these different types of conditions.  A Prime Implicant 
also contains a mixture of faulted and normal conditions.  For the sake of brevity, the normal 
conditions have been removed from the examples below and only the faulted conditions that 
produce the failure are shown. 
 
In this specific analysis, Prime Implicant 1 is: 
 
  … 
  IsoValveCond = Stuck Closed at time -1. 
  … 
 
This prime implicant corresponds to the condition that the propellant tank iso-valve represented 
in the Propulsion Sub-model has stuck closed and no thrust is possible.  This is a hardware-only 
error. 
 
On the other hand, Prime Implicant 2 is: 
 
  … 
  TargetPos = Inaccurate at time -1.  
  … 
 
The TargetPos node in the GN&C sub-model represents the accuracy of the target position 
determined by the translational guidance software function.  The PI identifies the possibility that 
a programmer introduced an error when coding the module, resulting in severely inaccurate 
output when the latter used.  This is a software-only error. 
 
Moreover, Prime Implicant 3 is: 
 
  … 
  Attitude = Correct at time -2 and 
  PropLineLeak = Small Leak at time -2 and 
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  Attitude = Slightly Inaccurate at time -1 and 
   PropLineLeak = Small Leak at time -1 and 
  RotThrusterComm = Slightly Inaccurate at time -1 and 
  Attitude = Inaccurate at time 0 
  … 
 
This Prime Implicant corresponds to a combination of hardware and software conditions.  The 
hardware condition is a small leak in one of the propellant lines.  The software condition is an 
algorithmic fault that causes drifting of the attitude control given a sub-nominal thrust caused by 
a line leak.  If only one of the two conditions exists, the Mini AERCam does not fail.  In 
particular, the GN&C software works properly when no leak exists.  Also, if a small leak occurs 
but there is no drift error in the attitude control, the GN&C is able to compensate for the leak by 
using the thrusters.  Only in the presence of both conditions would the GN&C function fail.  This 
PI example shows how this type of analysis identifies SW entry conditions for which the SW 
needs to be tested, which do not correspond to normal states of the system and may not be 
otherwise identified and tested for. 
 
3.2.4 Quantification of the DFM Model 
 
Once the prime implicants were identified for the different top events, these prime implicants 
were quantified to estimate the probabilities of the branch-points in the mission event tree shown 
in Figure 3-9.  DFM “top events” are quantified in fashion similar to fault-tree “top events”.  To 
quantify a DFM Top Event, the set of associated n prime implicants (PIs) is first converted into a 
set of m mutually exclusive implicants (MEIs) as shown in Equation [3.2]. 
 
Top Event = MEI1 ∨ … ∨ MEIm 
[3.2] 
 
The sum of probabilities for the MEIs yields the probability of the Top Event as expressed in 
Equation [3.3]. 
 
P(Top Event) = P(MEI1) + … + P(MEIm) 
[3.3] 
 
In the analysis, Prime Implicant 3 was found to be one of the mutually exclusive implicants.  It 
was quantified by considering the “entry condition” (i.e. small propellant line leak) and the 
conditional probability that the software causes an attitude shift under this triggering condition.  
The former entry condition was quantified with data from a HW failure rate database (NPRD).  
The failure rate associated with the entry condition was determined to be 6.0E-06/hr.  Given a 
mission duration of 5 hours, the probability is: 
 
P(C3) = 3.0E-05. 
 
Testing of the software conditional failure rate using real hardware in a test-as-you-fly 
configuration is ideal, but was considered unrealistic for this project.  Instead, the software 
conditional failure probability was estimated by testing the attitude control function under the 
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simulated presence of the entry condition using a Virtual System Integration Laboratory (VSIL) 
simulation of the hardware provided by Triakis Corporation.  The VSIL simulation uses 
hardware documentation to produce a realistic software model of the hardware that can interface 
with the actual GN&C software.  Using the VSIL simulation allows the testing group to easily 
generate realistic failure modes in the simulated hardware and observe how the actual software 
behaves under these conditions.  These failures have the added benefit of being isolated failures, 
since any change in behavior when a fault is injected are the result of that failure and not a 
coincidental hardware failure that occurred during the test.  The simulation also maintains a 
record of the state of the hardware and the software at any point during the simulation, so the 
GN&C software variables can be observed and compared to the hardware values and 
algorithmically correct values to determine the correctness of the GN&C’s output.  These results 
can be used to define the decision table values for the GN&C DFM sub-model. 
 
To quantify the conditional software failure contribution to Prime Implicant 3, an unfaulted 
baseline mission profile was simulated and it was confirmed that the GN&C software functioned 
correctly.  The baseline mission is as follows: 
• The Mini AER Cam begins at position (0, 0, 0) with an attitude of (0, 0, 0) pyr 
• The Mini AER Cam simultaneously moves to (-5, -25, 10) and rotates to (0, -75, 0) 
• The Mini AER Cam holds position, rotates to (-30, 0, -35), and transmits video 
• The Mini AER Cam simultaneously moves to (0, 0, 0) and rotates to (0, 75, 0) 
• Both point-to-point maneuvers last 900 seconds 
• The position hold lasts 450 seconds 
 
A function was then added to simulate the presence of the gas leak and a series of test runs were 
performed to determine how the GN&C behaved under the faulted conditions.  The function 
allowed the gas leak to occur at any time during the simulation, in any direction, and with any 
combination of force and torque. 
 
A combination of intelligent partitioning and randomization was used to ensure that the test cases 
covered the mission space as completely as possible.  Testing showed that each attitude 
maneuver consisted of 3 phases: 
1. Initial movement 
2. Oscillation 
3. Stabilization 
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Figure 3-13: The 3 Phases of a Rotational Movement (Changing Yaw from 0 to -75) 
The three phases take a disproportionate amount of time, so having the leak start at a random 
time during the mission would have tested the stabilization phase much more rigorously than the 
movement phase, even though the stabilization phase was considered the least likely to manifest 
a failure during a leak.  To prevent this, an equal number of tests were performed for each phase, 
with the leak starting at a random time during that phase. 
 
The direction of each leak was randomized, with pitch, yaw, and roll equally represented.  The 
force of the leak was randomized to be uniformly distributed between 5% and 40% of the Mini 
AER Cam’s thrust in that direction.  The upper limit was selected in accordance with the 
definition of a small leak (0-40% of thrust).  The lower limit was selected because leaks with 
very small force were unlikely to produce results more severe than larger leaks and testing time 
was limited. 
 
A total of 351 test cases were run.  This number was determined by the time limits on the 
project; more cases would have been desirable.  State data was recorded at 1 second intervals.  A 
test case was considered a success if the Mini AER Cam’s actual orientation stabilized within the 
time allotted, and stabilized to within 8º per axis of the commanded orientation.  8º per axis was 
chosen because this is NASA’s official success criterion for Mini AER Cam attitude accuracy.  
Other state data was recorded to clarify the decision tables in the GN&C DFM sub-model. 
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Figure 3-14: The Effect of a 12mlb Leak Injected After 625 seconds 
 
 
None of the test cases produced an error, so a straight Bayesian estimation was used to establish 
a preliminary failure probability estimate of: 
 
PF|C3 = 2.83E-3 
 
Because the real hardware was not used for the testing, an adjustment to the preliminary PF|C3 
was made using the Probability Adjustment table in Table 2-1. 
 
Type of Entry Condition = Exception 
Type of SW Function = Well Specified - Complex 
Type of Testing = Formal in Simulated System Configuration 
 
After expert elicitation from the VSIL team and examination of the quality of documentation 
used to create the simulation, an adjustment factor of 15 was chosen to reflect the departure from 
“test as you fly” principle introduced by using a simulation of the Mini AERCam hardware. 
 
After applying the adjustment: 
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P’F|C3 = 2.83E-3 x 15 
P’F|C3 = 4.2E-2 
 
Hence, the probability estimate for this mutually exclusive implicant is found to be: 
 
P(MEI3) = P(C3) x P’F|C3 
P(MEI3) = 3.0E-5 x 4.2E-2 
P(MEI3) = 1.26E-6 
 
This estimate can be combined with the estimates for the other mutually exclusive implicants to 
obtain the branch point probability for the autonomous point-to-point maneuver failure of the 
mission event tree.   
 
Similarly, the DFM model hierarchy can be analyzed for an “Autonomous Station Keeping 
Failure” top event.  The prime implicants can then be quantified to estimate the Autonomous 
Station Keeping failure branch point probability.  Once the mission event tree branch point 
probabilities are determined, the probabilities for the different success and failure end states can 
be estimated. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The methodological developments and applications documented in this report are motivated by 
the self-evident reality that software is today pervasive as a key component of modern space 
systems, performing the widest range of critical functions, and that, despite this reality, the 
development of generally accepted solutions to software-related safety and mission risk issues 
has been lagging far behind the development of such broad space-systems software applications.  
Still today most PRA and system reliability assessments do not adequately address software 
contribution to risk, either because software risk analysis is considered too difficult to carry out, 
or because the software contribution to risk is arbitrarily assumed to be negligible in comparison 
to hardware contributions.   
 
Several software-related failures in space systems over the recent years gave strong evidence 
that software contributes significantly to the overall risk of mission failure for such systems.  In 
addition, a review of the investigation reports for these failures reveals that a large portion of 
these failures was due to fairly complex “balance-of-system” – software interactions.  The fatal 
factor was often the occurrence of unexpected system conditions for which the software was not 
logically designed nor programmed, and to which therefore it provided the “wrong” response.  
In general terms, it can be reasonably inferred from such a review that the traditional software 
test and V&V processes may be effective in preventing errors in translation of software 
specification into software code – “Type A” failures, according to the classification summarily 
introduced in the Executive Summary of this report.  It may also be inferred that the traditional 
processes may be also reasonably effective, when not impaired by overly restrictive constraints 
of schedule and budget,  in preventing incorrect key data entries – “Type B” failures, in the 
language of the same above mentioned classification.  However, it is quite clear form the 
recorded failure history that the traditional processes are not sufficiently effective in preventing 
incorrect design or incomplete specifications – “Type C” failures. 
 
This report has discussed the Context-based Software Risk Model, a risk assessment framework 
that, while capable of addressing Type A and B situations, is more specifically oriented towards 
the identification, assessment and prevention of Type C situations.  CSRM uses a combination of 
traditional approaches (event trees and fault trees) and more advanced logic-modeling 
techniques, such as DFM or other methods in the same class, to estimate and integrate the 
contribution of digital systems and software into the overall system risk. 
 
The CSRM approach enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-
intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a fashion that is designed to be compatible and 
integrated with the format of a “standard” PRA.  The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path 
and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, 
within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety 
and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated.  The framework is based on 
the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios, whose causality and dynamic 
characteristics can be modeled and identified with the PRA and advanced techniques mentioned 
above.  The scenarios derived from these traditional and advanced techniques can be synthesized 
and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation that.  This CRSM method, 
unlike traditional software V&V methods, lends itself well to identifying and assessing not only 
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Type A and Type B, but also, and more relevantly for the reasons that have been discussed above 
and earlier in this report, Type C failures.   
 
The CSRM concepts have been illustrated in this report via simplified examples and then fully 
demonstrated with a “real-life” project application to the Mini AER Cam system.  The risk 
assessment and PRA-integration application of the Mini AER Cam has been carried out and 
completed for the NASA Johnson Space Center and has been fully documented in Chapter 3 of 
this report.  The assessment carried out was primarily focused on: 
 
• developing a CSRM framework to model the interactions of the Mini AER Cam 
software-intensive digital control system and the various interfacing sub-systems 
executing the various modes of rotational and translational control; 
• demonstrating the risk-informed testing and PRA-oriented quantification process based 
on the Mini AER Cam CSRM models. 
 
In the Mini AER Cam demonstration of the CSRM concepts, top-level mission event trees were 
developed to set up a standard PRA framework within which the more advanced, digital-system 
and software focused DFM models were integrated to carry out the CSRM modeling steps.  The 
DFM analytical process was then applied to identify “system contexts” and digital system 
response modes, inclusive of possible faulty or inadequate responses.  Finally, a risk-informed, 
CSRM based testing process was executed with the help of a full system simulator package.  The 
risk-informed and model-based testing showed how a risk level in the order of 10-5 for a specific 
risk scenario and context can be successfully and defensibly targeted for demonstration with a 
test effort in the order of a few hundred hours of computer and simulator time.   
 
The Mini AER Cam risk-informed testing successfully completed the series of CSRM process 
steps and the associated demonstration of the CSRM end-to-end risk modeling, quantification, 
and PRA-integration capabilities.  The Mini AER Cam application showed that CSRM offers a 
feasible approach to estimate the risk contribution of digital/software controlled systems with a 
reasonable level of effort. 
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APPENDIX A SOFTWARE RELIABILITY CONCEPTS 
 
A.1 Definition of Software Reliability 
 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers has formulated the following definition of 
software reliability (Ref. A-1):  
  
“Software reliability is the probability that the software will not cause the failure of a product or 
of a mission for a specified time under specified conditions; this probability is a function of the 
inputs to and use of the product, as well as a function of the existence of faults in the software; 
the inputs to the product will determine whether an existing fault is encountered or not.” 
 
The above definition is consistent with the observations made in Chapter 1.  Its first part is 
similar to the standard definition used for hardware reliability and in principle enables one to 
compare and assess with similar metrics the reliability of systems composed of both hardware 
and software components.  The second part of the definition explicitly recognizes software 
reliability as being a strong function of the inputs.  That is, it makes software reliability a 
function of the “context” in which the software operates, i.e., of system or environment 
conditions that are external to the software itself (Ref A-2).  As it turns out, the potential 
variability of external inputs and their possible “drift” outside the software design boundaries is a 
much more common cause of failure than its conceptual equivalent for hardware, i.e., the 
deviation from the use of specification boundaries stipulated for a specific hardware component 
or subsystem.   
 
A.2 Software Reliability Versus Hardware Reliability 
 
A key difference in the reliability of software with respect to that of hardware is in the role of the 
time variable.  Unlike hardware, software does not deteriorate with operation-time (unless 
external intervention like reprogramming during operation is allowed, and this introduces new 
faults).  Thus, the passing of time is not in itself relevant to the probability that new faults may 
appear in a mission-critical software function and make it fail.  The truly relevant factor that 
determines the software reliability is the occurrence or not of certain external inputs conditions 
within a given number of software execution cycles.  Such external input conditions determine 
the activation or not of i) specific execution paths within the SW, and ii) special “exception 
handling routines”.  The activation of these paths or routines may turn out to be the trigger for 
the software execution of logic paths containing faults, resulting in software function failure. 
 
A.3 Software Reliability Models 
 
Software reliability models are a class of models developed to predict or estimate the reliability 
of software based on historical data or project specific testing data.  Although more than 200 
models have been developed in the past 30 years, the question of how to quantify software 
reliability is still unsolved.  It is generally accepted that no single model that can be used in all 
situations.  One model may work well for certain classes of software, but may be entirely not 
applicable for other classes.  Section A.A.3.1 gives an example of a software reliability model, 
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the Schneidewind Model (Ref. A-3).  Many other software reliability models can be found in 
Refs. A-4 to A-6. 
 
A.A.3.1 Schneidewind Model 
 
The basic assumptions used in the derivation of the Schneidewind Model are as follows: 
 
• During each phase of test and/or operation, software faults are detected and removed. 
• The removal of faults does not introduce new faults (or the rate of removal of faults 
exceeds the rate of introduction of new faults); accordingly, the reliability of the software 
increases with the testing/operation progression (this is the common feature of all 
reliability-growth models). 
• The detected error process for a given software module is a non-homogeneous Poisson 
process with an exponentially decaying rate given, in each successive time interval Δti, 
by: 
 
di = α exp (− βi) 
[A.1] 
 
Given the above modeling assumptions, the Schneidewind Model permits an estimation of the 
model parameters α and β from the fault removal observations in a series of test cycles.  This is 
normally accomplished via a least-square fit of the fault detection-and-removal data, i.e., the 
number of errors, X(0, t1) in a test interval (0, t1), executed according to a maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) process. 
 
Once the parameters α and β have been estimated, the model forecasts the number of failures in 
an operational time interval (t1, t2) following the test cycles, according to the formula: 
 
F(t1, t2) = (α/β) [ 1 − exp(−β t2) ] − X(0, t1) 
[A.2] 
 
The above expression can in practice be used as an estimate of the software module failure 
probability in the (t1, t2) time interval. If the time interval (t1, t2) is relatively short, an “equivalent 
software failure rate” in that operational interval can be approximately defined as: 
 
λ1,2 = F(t1, t2) / (t2 − t1) 
[A.3] 
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APPENDIX B FAULT COVERAGE 
 
B.1 Fault Coverage and Conditional Coverage 
 
In relation to the concept of software failure and software reliability, it is useful to consider the 
concept of “fault coverage.”  This concept was originated to characterize the behavior of 
software / hardware systems that are designed to recover from the occurrence of certain types of 
faults [3].   
 
In essence, Fault Coverage may be qualitatively defined as the ability of a system software to 
recover from the occurrence of an anticipated fault, and quantitatively characterized by means of 
the conditional probability that a system will continue to operate successfully or fail in a safe 
manner under the presence of a fault, given that it was operating correctly prior to the occurrence 
of that fault. 
 
Referring more specifically to a software system or functional module, the above definition of 
fault coverage can be extended into a conceptually similar, albeit broader, definition of 
Condition Coverage. In the context of an entire system, condition coverage is the ability of the 
software to correctly respond to the occurrence of certain input and external conditions, 
including system fault or failure conditions. 
 
Software condition coverage can be expressed as a conditional probability, PS/Ci, that a software 
module or component will continue to operate successfully or fail in a safe manner under the 
presence of a given input condition, Ci, given that it was operating correctly prior to the 
occurrence of the condition. 
 
Note that, in the way we have defined it, a condition Ci can be the reflection of a particular 
system operating mode, or of the occurrence of an event external to the system of which the 
software is part, or of a system hardware failure.  Note also, along with that, that it may thus 
reflect an event that was anticipated and expressly included within the envelope of the system 
design or an unanticipated event. 
 
The probability that the software will cause a system failure upon the occurrence of condition Ci, 
which may happen with probability P(Ci), can be expressed as:  
 
)P(1)P(CPOF
iS/Cii −×=  
[B.1] 
 
where PS/Ci denotes the conditional probability of successful software execution, given the 
occurrence of the input condition Ci . 
 
If one can then enumerate all the relevant input conditions for the software, the Equation [B.1] 
leads to the following expression for the overall probability of software-induced system failure: 
 [ ]∑ −×= i S/Ci )P(1)P(CPOF i  
[B.2] 
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In a practical sense, Equation [B.2] can be used to obtain a reasonably accurate estimate of 
software failure probability without necessarily identifying “all” the Ci conditions, but only the 
subset of these for which the product on the right hand side of Equation [B.1] yields a non-
negligible value. 
 
B.2 Test Coverage 
 
Software testing provides, depending on its thoroughness and completeness, varying degrees of 
assurance that a given software component is fault free. Test coverage is an attribute associated 
with the testing process that may be used to characterize its thoroughness and effectiveness. Test 
coverage represents the degree of completeness (in percent) of the software testing with respect 
to all the possible combinations of input parameters and external interface conditions that the 
software may encounter in its actual mission. 
 
100% test coverage can only be achieved for relatively simple software. In general, if subscript j 
indicates the set of conditions for which the software can be fully tested (and corrected, if a fault 
is found) and the subscript k the set for which it cannot be fully tested, one can assume that: 
 
PS/Cj = 1 for all j’s  
[B.3] 
 
which yields: 
 [ ] 0)P(1)P(C
j S/Cj j
=−×∑  
[B.4] 
 
so that the overall probability of system failure becomes: 
 [ ]∑ −×= k S/Ck )P(1)P(CPOF k  
[B.5] 
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APPENDIX C DYNAMIC FLOWGRAPH METHODOLOGY 
 
DFM is a software analytical toolset that has been demonstrated in pilot U.S. NRC and NASA 
applications (Refs. C-1, C-2).  It combines multi-valued logic modeling and analysis capabilities, 
and can be integrated with an Event Tree/Fault Tree PRA logic structure.  DFM has several 
unique features that address digital systems: 
 
- The capability to model and analyze feedback loops and time transitions, 
- Its deductive and inductive modules can analyze detailed multi-valued logic models to 
find interactive failure modes and software error forcing contexts.  The deductive module 
explores the causality of the system model in reverse and generates prime implicants that 
can be thought of as multi-valued logic equivalent of minimal cut sets.  On the other 
hand, the inductive module follows the causality of the system model and produces 
automated Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) trees. 
- The capability to quantify the top events analyzed by the deductive analysis module. 
 
The essential steps in applying DFM in to software controlled systems are: 
 
1. Construct a DFM model to represent the system of interest. 
2. Analyze the DFM model. 
3. Quantify the results. 
 
These three essential steps are briefly covered below: 
 
C.1 DFM Model Construction 
 
A DFM model is a graphic network that links key process parameters to represent the cause-and-
effect and the time-dependent relationships.  In particular, for a digital control system, both the 
controlled/monitored process and the controlling software itself are represented in the DFM 
model. 
 
Key controlled/monitored process parameters and software variables that capture the essential 
behavior of these components and software/firmware functions are identified and represented as 
process variable nodes.  These process variable nodes are then linked together through transfer 
boxes or transition boxes for instantaneous actions or time-delayed actions respectively.  
Detailed transfer functions that modeled the relationships between these parameters are 
represented as decision tables.  These decision tables are essentially multi-logic extension of 
binary truth tables.  Discrete behaviors such as component failures and logic switching actions 
are then identified and represented as condition nodes, these condition nodes act as switches that 
toggle the transfer functions governing the relationship between process variable nodes.   
 
The decision tables can be constructed by empirical knowledge of the system, from the equations 
that govern the system behavior, or from available software code and/or pseudo code.  In 
particular, when modeling a system that includes actual software, module testing (which itself 
constitutes the basic first step of standard software testing procedures) becomes an integral part 
in the creation of the decision tables that mimic the actual behavior of the software.  
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C.2 DFM Model Analysis 
 
The analysis of a DFM system model can be conducted by tracing sequences of events either 
backward from effects to causes (i.e., “deductively”), or forward from causes to effects (i.e., 
“inductively”) through the model structure.   
 
C.2.1 Deductive DFM Analysis 
 
The deductive engine backtracks the time and causality of the DFM model to identify timed 
prime implicants (TPI) (Ref. C-3) for top events of interest.  These timed prime implicants, 
characterized by the combinations and sequences of basic variable states, represent the full set of 
minimal conditions that would lead to the top event.  Prime implicants are the multi-valued logic 
equivalent of minimal cut sets in traditional fault tree analysis.  The DFM prime implicants are 
logically compatible with SAPHIRE cut sets.  Hence, DFM results can be exported into the 
SAPHIRE environment. 
 
In a deductive analysis, it is sometimes advantageous to define dynamic consistency rules to 
prune out conditions that are not compatible with the dynamic constraints of the system of 
interest.  Eliminating the incompatible conditions will reduce the number of intermediate events 
and prime implicants generated, thus, making the analysis more efficient.  For instance, dynamic 
consistency rules can be defined to constrain: 
 
• The direction of change of certain parameters.  For example, if repair is not available, a 
component, once enters into a failed state, remains in that state, or 
• The rate of change of certain parameters. 
 
C.2.2 Inductive DFM Analysis 
 
Besides the deductive engine, the inductive engine can be executed to determine how a particular 
set of basic variable states (the initial condition) produces various sequences and system level 
states.  Starting from a set of initial conditions, the inductive engine follows the causality and 
timing represented in the model to determine the resulting sequence of events. 
 
Thus, in the deductive and inductive engines, DFM provides the multi-state and time-dependent 
equivalent of ET/FT analysis and failure mode and effect analysis. The substantial advantage is 
that once the DFM system model has been developed, the same model can be analyzed 
deductively and inductively an unlimited number of times by automated execution.  This is more 
efficient compared to the integration of the former classical techniques. 
 
C.2.3 Applications of Deductive and Inductive Analyses 
 
Inductive and deductive analyses can be combined to analyze the system within the context of 1) 
design verification, 2) fault analysis, or 3) automated test vector analysis. 
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C.2.3.1 Design Verification 
 
In a design verification, the goal is to show that the system designed satisfies requirements that 
describe desirable system properties.  Using DFM, deductive analysis or inductive analysis can 
be carried out, depending on the characteristics of the requirement statements being checked.  If 
the requirement statements specify desirable system properties, such as a particular condition 
must occur as a result of some triggering conditions, an inductive analysis can be executed to 
show whether this is indeed the case.  The initial condition is defined to be the triggering 
condition, and the subsequent conditions identified by the Analysis Engine through a 
propagation of the system model are checked to see if the condition that is specified in the 
requirements can be reached.  On the other hand, if the requirement statements specify 
undesirable system properties, such as certain conditions that must not occur after some prior 
conditions, this type of statements can be easily verified by a deductive DFM analysis.  The top 
event condition is defined as the conjunction of the undesirable condition and the prior condition, 
separated by a number of time steps specified in the requirements.  If the Analysis Engine does 
not find any prime implicant for this top event, this means that no pathway exists by which the 
undesirable condition can result from the prior condition, and hence the requirement is satisfied. 
 
C.2.3.2 Failure and Fault Analysis 
 
The objective of a failure and fault analysis is either to identify potential faults in the system or 
investigate the effects of basic component failure modes on the system performance.   The 
deductive analysis technique is suitable for identifying potential faults.  A top event is defined as 
an undesirable system level condition, and the prime implicants identified by the Analysis 
Engine represent the potential faults that could lead to this system level condition.  The inductive 
analysis technique is applicable to unravel the effects of basic component failure modes on the 
system.  It can be used as an automated FMEA.  Combinations of basic component failure modes 
are defined in the initial condition and the boundary condition, and the Analysis Engine 
propagates these through the system model to see their effects downstream in subsequent time 
steps.  The reader should note that if a combination of basic failure modes is being investigated, 
the individual failure modes do not need to occur in the same time step.  The initial condition and 
the boundary condition can be defined to represent special failure profiles, where the failure 
events follow in sequential order. 
  
C.2.3.3 Automated Test Vector Analysis 
 
For automated test vector analysis, DFM is used to analyze the software and system design and 
to identify special input combinations that can distinguish between the normal states and the 
faulted states of specific components.  Instead of randomly sampling a large number of inputs to 
test the software, a DFM analysis can be used to decompose the software input space into a 
number of the contexts (Ref. C-4) and to identify special inputs to test these contexts.  The 
automated test vector analysis procedure in DFM is an extension of the Automatic Test Vector 
Generation (ATVG) procedures used in the testing of digital circuits.  More specifically, this 
DFM procedure is the multi-valued logic equivalent of the Boolean Difference based procedures 
formulated for binary circuit ATVG (Ref. C-5).  The goal of the digital circuit ATVG procedure 
is to identify special test input combinations, such that changing these inputs in specific ways 
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will cause the observable circuit output to change only if the circuit is free of faults.  On the other 
hand, if the specific type of fault for which the test is carried out is present, the observable output 
will remain unchanged.  The DFM automated test vector analysis procedure is capable of 
handling multi-valued logic functions modeled with DFM, enabling the procedure to be applied 
to test complex software and control systems which exhibit analog-equivalent behavior.  In this 
DFM-based ATVG procedure, the Boolean Difference method for binary logic is reformulated, 
and is translated into a procedure for reducing the prime implicants associated with specially 
defined top events.  The reduced set of prime implicants defines the special input combinations 
that can be used to test for specific faults.  Like their binary circuit counter parts, these inputs 
have the characteristic of causing the observable outputs to change if a specific fault is absent, 
but to remain constant if that fault is present. 
 
C.3 Quantification of DFM Analysis Results 
 
The quantification module is used to quantify results obtained in a deductive analysis.  It 
estimates the probability of the top event based on the probability estimates of the basic events 
that make up the timed prime implicants.  Suppose a deductive analysis yields n prime 
implicants, PI#1 through PI #n, as shown in Equation [C.1]. 
 
Top Event = PI #1 ∨ ... ∨ PI #n 
[C.1] 
 
PI #i ⊄ PI #j, for any i ≠ j 
 
This set of prime implicants is first converted into a set of m mutually exclusive implicants, MEI 
#1 through MEI #m, as shown in Equation [C.2].  These mutually exclusive implicants can be 
thought of as the multi-valued logic equivalent of cut sets that do not yield any cross product 
term.  Thus, the sum of the probabilities of these mutually exclusive implicants yields the 
probability of the top event, as shown in Equation [C.3]. 
 
Top Event = MMI #1 ∨ ... ∨ MMI #m 
[C.2] 
 
where MMI #i ∧ MMI #j = φ for any i ≠ j 
 
P(Top Event) = P(MMI #1) + ... + P(MMI #m) 
[C.3] 
 
C.4 Application of DFM within the Framework of CSRM 
 
When applied within the Context-based SW Risk Modeling framework, a system DFM model is 
first constructed to capture the system hardware, the software, as well as the interactions between 
the software and the hardware/the environment.  A DFM model consists of multi-state nodes that 
correspond to key parameters in the hardware, the software, and the hardware/software 
interfaces.  The detailed relationship between these multi-state nodes are represented in the form 
of decision tables, the multi-valued logic equivalent of binary truth tables.  It is important to 
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point out that DFM supports the application at an early design stage.  A DFM model can be 
constructed from functional requirements.  As the design matures, the DFM model can evolve 
and be expanded to include the additional detailed information. 
 
Once a DFM model is constructed, the analysis proceeds as follows: 
 
Top events are defined in terms of states of the nodes.  For software risk assessment, top events 
of interest include states of system level nodes corresponding to unsafe/undesirable conditions.  
These top events are analyzed by exploring the logic within the DFM model to unravel the root 
causes (combinations of hardware and software conditions) for these unsafe/undesirable system 
states.  Analysis of the DFM model yields prime implicants (PIs), which are the multi-valued 
logic equivalent of minimal cut sets in a traditional fault tree analysis.  Equation [C.4] is a logical 
representation for the ith Top Event (TEi), which is decomposed into its n prime implicants. 
 
TEi = PI1 ∨ … ∨ PIn, 
[C.4] 
 
Each prime implicant is a conjunction of the states of the nodes in the DFM model, as shown in 
equation [C.5]: 
 
PIj = SN1 ∧ SN2 ∧ …, 
[C.5] 
 
Where SN1 represents the state of node N1.  If node N1 does not appear in the prime implicant, 
SN1 becomes the “Don’t Care” state. 
 
The prime implicants obtained in a DFM analysis can be generally classified into 3 types: 
1. Prime implicants that are conjunction of hardware states.  This class of prime implicants 
represents hardware only fault conditions. 
2. Prime implicants that are conjunction of software states.  This class of prime implicants 
represents software only fault conditions. 
3. Prime implicants that are conjunction of hardware states and software states.  This class 
of prime implicants represents software fault conditions that are triggered by some 
specific hardware conditions. 
 
The DFM top events are quantified in fashion similar to fault-tree top events.  For a particular 
top event i, the set of n prime implicants represented in equation [C.4] is first converted to a set 
of m mutually exclusive implicants (MEIs) represented in equation [C.6].  As all the cross 
product terms correspond to the FALSE condition, the probability of the top event can be 
calculated as the sum of the probabilities for these mutually exclusive implicants, as shown in 
equation [C.7]. 
 
TEi = MEI1 ∨ … ∨ MEIm, 
Where MEIx ∧ MEIy = False for x ≠ y 
[C.6] 
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P(TEi) = P(MEI1) + … + P(MEIm), 
[C.7] 
 
An example of the type of mutually exclusive implicants corresponding to a conjunction of 
hardware and software states is shown in equation [C.8], where SNSW1, …, SNSWx correspond to 
states of the software nodes NSW1, … NSwx, and SNH1, …, SNHy correspond to states of the balance 
of system nodes NH1, … NHy that enables the software conditions.  The quantitative estimate for 
this type of mutually exclusive implicant is shown in equation [C.9].  
 
MEIj = (SNH1 ∧ … ∧ SNHy) ∧ (SNSW1 ∧ … ∧ SNSWx)  
[C.8] 
 
P(MEIj) = P(SNH1 ∧ … ∧ SNHy) x P(SNSW1 ∧ … ∧ SNSWx) 
[C.9] 
 
Note that equation [C.9] corresponds to the complement of the summation terms shown in 
equation [2.4] of the CSRM section (Section 2.1.3).  In fact, P(SNH1 ∧ … ∧ SNHy) is a 
decomposition of P(SCi) and P(SNSW1 ∧ … ∧ SNSWx) is a decomposition of 1 - P(SWR/SCi). 
 
In the quantification process, the estimates for the software conditions can be obtained either by: 
 
1. Use a specific test strategy (i.e., straight test vs. fault removal mode) to assess risk level, 
or 
2. First identify a level of risk identified as being acceptable for the scenario of interest, and 
then conduct the level of testing necessary to reach reasonable assurance the system will 
operate at or below such level. 
 
The choices regarding the testing strategy (normal/Type A condition versus abnormal/Type B 
condition), and the estimation of testing results (BBN-Bayesian versus non-informative prior-
Bayesian), are fully in-line with the discussion in Section 2.1.3.1. 
 
If DFM is applied within the CSRM framework, the DFM analytical results can be combined 
with analytical results from other tools to identify and quantify a set of software driven risk 
scenarios. 
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